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Article 7

into the face of such violence, take it upon ourselves, and
even, ifcalled upon to do so, bear up and suffer in some way
because ofit? As staff, administrators, and teachers on

college campuses related to the church, how might our tasks
be affected, even altered, by a serious living out of the
words.

WHAT I HAVE LEARNED: MAYBE PLATO WAS RIGHT
Richard Yivisaker

PRELIMINARY EXAMPLES

Power By Competing Interests, It Has To Be Assumed
That There Is A Moral Basis For Politics Which
Transcends Special Interests.
Indeed, even the rightful pursuit ofpower on behalf of a
. particular interest assumes this. In our commitment to
democratic politics we may reject some or all of the extreme
measures to which Plato is led by this assumption. But the
challenge of constructing a democratic process consistent
with it is great. This may not mean, as it did for Plato, that
the challenge is unmeetable. But the reduction of democracy
to a naked or thinly disguised struggle for power parades
itself daily. 2 Plato knew a difficult problem when he saw
one.

(1) Communities Are Not Necessarily Better Off By
Becoming More Diverse.

(3) The Much-Derided Dualism of Body And Soul
Contains A Measure Of Truth.

We do not have to accept the vision of social differentiation
and hierarchy idealized in the Republic to see the truth in
Plato's view that a good society requires unity in diversity.
Diversity may be necessary, but it is not sufficient. It
contains the seeds of discord and disintegration along with
the potential for enriched life, as homogeneity brings unity
while threatening loss of vitality and decay .. Everything
depeqds on the wedding of diversity to some unity of
purpose. We may accept Charles Taylor's notion that a
''presumption" of value is owed to any deeply rooted
culture, but this presumption has to be tested in an
encounter of cultures whose outcome is uncertain. 1 This
requires a commitment to such encounter on the part of the
community, and this commitment is. the unity of purpose
which constitutes the community. If we were to turn our
attention to the call for increased diversity at colleges of the
church, creating the necessary unity in diversity would be
a major task. It is not a matter of simple addition.

Even ifwe take the radical dualism in Phaedo at face value,
there is more to be said for it than fashionable criticism
allows. We want to say, of course, that the very idea of
disembodied existence is both unappealing and barely
conceivable (ifconceivable at all). But this does not remove
the problems of embodied life which rightly concerned
Plato.

A popular view ofPlato holds that his world view has had
a great and largely detrimental influence while being
transparently false. I have not been immune to this oddly
dismissive attitude. It is with no little surprise, in fact, that
I have gradually come to see that Plato may have been
right. About everything? No. About some important things,
however, clearly yes. I want to fix on one point in
particular, a point which reverberates in a special way for
those who inhabit the academic world. But first a brief
consideration of some other points where Plato had an
insight that merits preserving.

(2) If Politics Is To Be More Than A Struggle For
Richard Yivisaker is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at
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Of particular interest is his worry about the impact of
embodiment on our cognitive life. For embodied creatures
awareness ofthe world is mediated by organs which register
and transmit sensory data. This leads to diverse points of
view, depending on species nature, on individual physiology
and psychology, on space-time location, and on cultural
factors carried by language. The hope ofliberating rational
consciousness from such dependence may strike us as
fanciful if not preposterous. As may the idea that we can
aspire to a form of consciousness which is without any
point ofview and thus god.:like. But bridging differences in
point of view is a cognitive (and moral) imperative for us.
So also, then, is discovering a process which in some way
makes this possible. Plato saw all of this with great clarity.
The point here is related to the earlier ones about morality
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and politics and unity in diversity, and it brings us to the
)dea that I have come to see as Plato's deepest.
TOWARD A COMMUNITY OF DISCOURSE
Another surprise for me over the years has been discovering
the strength of the penchant for doctrinaire pronouncement
among academic people. Our fondness for mere opinion, in
other words. Deconstructionists and Foucaultians will smile
knowingly at my belated loss of innocence. But we needn't
be deterred by their deflation of rational discourse as an
illusion masking some will to power or fear of the free play
of interpretation. Either they must defend their deflationary
strategy incoherently (with an appeal to reasoned argument)
or they offer us no reason to accept it. So we are free to
reconsider Plato's commitment to the dynamics of reason.
The distinction between knowledge and opinion is central to
the Republic. It was Plato's way of repudiating the
reduction of knowledge to power or to groundless
interpretation. Without this distinction the search for solid
moral judgment is meaningless and the good life therefore
impossible. Surely Plato was right about this. If personal
or collective opinion is the last word, the true and the good
are defined simply by our assent and thus become
dispensable notions, except as tools of persuasion which
work only until they are unmasked.
On the other hand, Plato's use of this distinction is
problematic. Taking it as a given epistemically, he makes it
call for a parallel and equally sharp distinction between the
objects of knowledge and opinion: they cannot be distinct
purchases on reality unless they are about different realities.
Epistemology thus entails metaphysics. In this way the
original distinction produces a fundamental divide between
stable, mind-transcending models or exemplars (the Forms)
and the space-time particulars which are their images.
We are rightly suspicious of the claim that knowledge and
opinion cannot be about the same objects, even if we agree
that epistemically there is a qualitative difference between
them. But Plato's mistake is not the blatant one it is often
taken to be. Crucial marks of knowledge cannot be detached
from metaphysical considerations. For example, legitimate
claims to know must be supported by good reasons, by
"reasoned discourse" or "a reasoned account of reality"
which can "survive all refutations," as Socrates puts it in
Republic VII. If we grant this, we cannot avoid the
question: About what sort of reality is it possible to have
"reasoned discourse"? Which puts us firmly on the path of

metaphysics. So Plato's attempt to harvest metaphysical hay
from the field of common-sense epistemology has something
to be said for it.
More important, however, is the way questions about the
links between knowledge, reasoned discourse, and reality
are embedded for Plato in questions about the good
community. Epistemology and metaphysics are inseparable
from ethics. Even if we are skeptical about his metaphysical
enterprise and suspicious of the social and ontological
hierarchies to which it leads, we do well to ponder his
insistence on the link between reasoned discourse and
community. For the larger society his vision of a
community built on reasoned discourse may be utopian; for
an academic community it should not be. It matters especially in such a community - how the views we hold are
supported and defended. Being right is not enough: better
to be wrong with good reason than right with bad (or no)
reasons. So I have slowly learned. This may seem obvious,
too obvious to have to be learned. But in my experience
tough-mindedness about the pedigree of your own beliefs,
especially the ones you hold dear, is not easy to come by. 3
TWO CASES
Possible examples of the difficulty are legion. I choose two
which are of particular interest to me. In each case the
choice reflects my confidence both about an important truth
and about the negligence of a particular defense of it.

( 1) The Death Penalty Is Wrong And Should Be
Abolished.
I have little doubt about the truth of this, though the tide in
our country is running the other way. However, I have even
less doubt about bad defenses of this truth. I pick one such
defense, though a variety is ready to hand; and I pick it
because it is close to home.
The E.L.C.A. is in the practice of issuing social statements
on major public issues. These statements become the basis
for continued discussion in the church and for public policy
advocacy. A minimal requirement is that the positions they
adopt be defended carefully and honestly, that no shortcuts
be taken to make them appear self-evident. An egregious
failure to meet this requirement is provided by the church's
1991 statement on the death penalty. 4 Anyone who has
really thought about this issue knows that the strongest case
for retaining the death penalty is based on the demand for
just retribution. It presses such questions as these: What
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penalty "fits" or is "deserved by" the uniquely heinous
crime of first degree murder? What punishment adequately
upholds the community's consensus about the depth of the
wrong committed by a brutal taking of innocent life? This
case for the death penalty needs to be taken seriously by
any convincing case against it: Can the demand for just
retribution be met without recourse to the death penalty? If
so, how? Is that demand itself misguided? If so, why?
There is more than one way of minimizing this challenge. A
common one is to equate just retribution with vengeance.
For the E.L.C.A.'s social statement, however, the challenge
hardly exists. Though it repeatedly cites justice as a goal of
the church's social action, the statement shows scant
understanding of distinctions which are crucial to
understanding this goal. In the brief section on "Doing
Justice,"5 we find the following:
Violent crime is, ih part, a reminder of human failure to
ensure justice for all members of society. People often
respond to violent crime as though it were exclusively a
matter of the criminal's individual failure. The death
penalty exacts and symbolizes the ultimate personal
retribution.
Yet, capital punishment makes no provable impact on the
breeding grounds of violent crime. Executions harm
society by mirroring and reinforcing existing injustice.
The death penalty distracts usfrom our work toward a just
society. . . It perpetuates cycles of violence.
The statement then calls for "an assault on the root causes
of violent crime" and asserts without argument that
problems of fairness in the administration of the death
penalty are insurmountable. Finally, we are told that
The practice of the death penalty undermines any possible
moral message we might want to 'send. ' It is not fair and
fails to make society better or safer. The message
conveyed by an execution . . . is one of brutality and
violence. 6
In a few lines the demand for just retribution is first
slighted, then confused with different concerns, and finally
obliterated. It is hard to imagine less regard for reasoned
discourse. The presupposition ofthe argument, if there is an
argument, is that the primary agent of crime is society, the
alleged criminal being more a victim than a perpetrator of
injustice. This presupposition is not self-evident; it needs to
be argued. And it needs to be argued case by case-unless we

fall back on a social determinism which removes all
responsibility and with it any role for the notions ofjustice
and injustice. This, too, would need to be argued.
(2) We Must Extend The Boundaries Of Moral Concern
Beyond Humanity To Encompass All Of The Natural
World.
I find this imperative as compelling as the one about the
death penalty. It certainly is unproblematic within a
theocentric ethic: "The earth is the Lord's and the fulness
thereof." But how make it compelling to resistant non
theists?
Consider a recent attempt in this direction: Larry
Rasmussen's Earth Community Earth Ethics.7 Though there
is much to admire in Rasmussen's book, it provides another
example of the failure to offer compelling reasons for a
strongly held position. We may agree with Rasmussen's
judgment that a way of life tied to a consumption-driven,
globally expanding market economy is unsustainable and
that its threat to ecological well-being is growing
exponentially, and agree as well that the urgency of the
situation calls for a paradigm shift in our moral thinking.
But how are we to ground the necessary shift? Showing its
utility is one thing; grounding it is something else.
Rasmussen attempts to ground it in two ways. One is by
expanding the realm of sentient life, life capable of
experiencing pain; the other, as his title suggests, is by
enlarging our view of community. Each fails even
moderately stringent tests of rationality. The unintended
result is to tum Rasmussen's brief for a non-homocentric
ethic on its head.
There is no phrase more often repeated in his book than
"earth's distress." The less dramatic variants include
"creation's pain," "the cry of the earth," "nature's
suffering." Sometimes God is the one who is said to suffer
as a result of nature's degradation. More typically, however,
"earth," "nature," or "creation" itself is viewed as the
subject of suffering. This way of speaking serves to make
all of creation the focus of moral regard and to awaken
compassion for it. But what is the basis for adopting such
language? Rasmussen offers only constant use of the
language, intimating that refusal to adopt it is a sign of
homocentric arrogance. Emphatic reassertion, in other
words, rather than argument. It would indeed be arrogance
to deny suffering to nature where observable behavior
displays it. But where there is no such behavior, the
attribution of suffering becomes moralizing sentimentality.
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Rasmussen's other attempt to ground a radical revision of
.... our moral framework fails similarly: the natural world is
characterized in a way which encourages the revision, but
little rationale is offered for it beyond the characterization
itself. This time the language is that of "cosmic
community," "earth community," "the community of life,"
"creation as a genuine community," "nature as both the
aboriginal and comprehensive community." Such phrases
are used again and again as the basis for a "comprehensive
communitarian ethic. "8
The thinness of Rasmussen's argument is revealed as soon
as we ask how "community" is to be understood. The
difficulty he faces is that this concept must have moral
import and yet be comprehensively applicable. The latter
requirement is satisfied by explicating "community" in
broad relational terms. We hear about the "internal
relatedness and interdependence of creation," the
"interconnectedness . . . among all things," and the
"intricate togetherness of things." Talking this way is
convincing as long as we understand it in causal terms. It
is no accident that Rasmussen appeals to the discoveries of
natural science to ground his communitarian view of nature.
But causal interdependence, simply as such, lacks moral
import. Rasmussen unwittingly exposes the . crucial non
sequitur: 'The goodness of life together and the reciprocity
learned in genuine community create moral agency and
responsibility. "9 A community in which reciprocity is
learned is indeed a moral community; but the
interdependence which holds it together is more than causal,
a kind of interdependence we have been given no reason to
apply to the cosmos.
Aldo Leopold fell into the same error m his classic
expression of this communitarian vision.
All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that
the individual is a member of a community of
interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to compete
for his place in that community, but his ethics prompt him
also to co-operate . . . The land ethic simply enlarges the
boundary of the community to include soils, waters, plants,
and animals, or collectively: the land. 10
Ethics requires the context of community and community
requires an interdependence of cooperating members. But
the land (in Leopold's sense) is not such a community. The
mutuality essential to cooperation and hence to moral
community is absent.

Rasmussen and Leopold take a concept whose moral
pregnancy derives from a human context and extend it
beyond that context without supporting evidence.
Equivocating on the word "community," they end up
attacking a homocentric bias in ethics with a conceptual
move which is itself deeply homocentric. Ironically,
reconceiving the natural world in our image has become the
basis for reconceiving ourselves in nature's image.11 The
result is an expanded moral vision supported by no good
reason. Little more than mere opinion, Plato would have
said. And he would have been right.
THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES
Why should we care about having good reasons for our
beliefs? 12 Well, the likelihood of having true beliefs is
enhanced by good reasons. That is, good reasons make it
more likely that my beliefs reflect the way things really are
and not merely the way I want them to be. Suppose,
however, that we reject the very idea of "the way things
really are"; or we say that what matters about a view of the
cosmos is not whether it is objectively true but whether it
supports a preferred moral vision, or that moral visions do
not need grounding in the way things really are.
Plato, of course, would demur on all of these suppositions.
But assume that there is something to be said for them.
Even then Plato would continue to defend the demand for
good reasons since reason � linked to the possibility of g
community of discourse. Disdain good reasons and you risk
losing this possibility. 13 Reason fosters such a community
because it is by nature dialectical. Provoking us to discover
incoherence in our beliefs, it leads us to uncover the
assumptions on which they rest and to subject these
assumptions to critical scrutiny. In this way it pulls us
toward the vision of a ground which can compel the assent
of all who reach it and thus bind us together. But this
movement has to be governed by the mutuality it seeks;
hidden contradictions and underlying assumptions do not
yield readily to a solitary mind. The dialectic of reason is
of necessity dialogical.
Here, then, is the fundamental insight: Offering reasons to
support our beliefs and caring about the best possible
reasons is a way of exposing ourselves to others and
reaching out to them in the name of a community of
discourse, a way of inviting them to join us in building this
community. Refusing to provide reasons or to care about
them is a rejection of community, an attempt to get others
to accept our word as the last word. It is the will to power
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at work.

which needs argument and thus reasons.

Each of the ideas for which I earlier claimed Platonic
ancestry points to this final one. For me its essential
rightness has taken a long time to sink in. Teaching for
many years is what made it possible. Largely by
happenstance, I stumbled into a way of teaching which
involved taking positions in class - real positions, positions
to which I was seriously if provisionally committed - and
urging students to come at them with their probing
criticism. My initial motivation was to get them thinking by
making myself vulnerable in this way. But what I
discovered was a dialectic in which, on the good days, we
pushed each other into thinking in new ways and doing this
together for the sake of deeper understanding. I
rediscovered Plato.

Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, "A Social
Statement on: The Death Penalty" (September 1991).
5
Ibid, 3.

How can there be academic community without something
like this as the controlling ethos, in the conversations not
only of faculty with students but among students themselves
and even - the biggest challenge - within the faculty? How
( even more) can it fail to be the controlling ethos at a
college of the church, with its confession of faith in the
creative Word and trust in a Holy Spirit moving among us?
Here, at least, Athens and Jerusalem should meet.
NOTES
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Charles Taylor et. al., Multiculturalism: Examining the
Politics of Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994) 63-73.
Jesse Helms' use of the power of his chairmanship of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to prevent both
committee and floor debate on William Weld's nomination
to be Ambassador to Mexico is a recent example of a naked
exercise of power at the expense of the democratic process.
The fate of the McCain-Feingold bill on campaign finance
reform is another, though in that case the power struggle
was at least thinly disguised.
2

3

A likely rejoinder here would say, "Surely there are views
which can only be held with little or no reason." Perhaps.
But we ought to be suspicious of any particular claim to
this effect if it is made with no investigation of possible
reasons. That there are no possible reasons is itself a claim

4

6

Ibid, 4. Emphasis added.

Larry L. Rasmussen, Earth Community Earth Ethics
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996).

7

8

This theme appears throughout the book, but it is
especially prominent in the concluding part, "Earth Action,"
319 ff
9

Ibid, 313. Emphasis added.

Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 1949), 203-204.
10

It may be that homocentrism is inescapable here, that we
need to find a way through it to a recognition of worth in
the natural world which is independent of our interests.
Rasmussen occasionally suggests a possibility of this sort
without pursuing it: recognition of the ways in which we are
implicated in nature's web of causal interdependence has the
power to awaken gratitude for the gifts we receive from it.
Gratitude, of course, is homocentric: it is gratitude for a
benefit to us. But gratitude seems also to acknowledge the
intrinsic worth of the source of the benefit: we can hardly be
grateful if we view the source as having merely instrumental
value relative to our interests. Whether gratitude must
always be felt toward a person is a further question. An
intriguing one which bears on the possibility of having an
environmental ethic which can be non-theocentric as well as
theocentric.
11

Perhaps there are beliefs which are matters of "faith" and
not of reason (i.e. -of any conceivable kind of reason). But
beliefs designed to provide a non-theocentric foundation for
expanding the boundaries of moral regard are not promising
candidates.
12

Whether Plato would say further, following Rousseau in
The Social Contract, that without a community of discourse
no reason is possible, is unclear to me.
13
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